How should we analyze the new wave of trade tensions that gripped the world in 2025? To better understand the issues at stake, the World Inequality Lab recently published a historical study on global trade and financial imbalances since 1800 (« Unequal Exchange and North-South Relations. Evidence from Global Trade Flows and the World Balance of Payment, 1800-2025 », available on inequalitylab.world et wbop.world).

Several conclusions are clear. In general, the idea of spontaneously balanced and harmonious free trade does not stand up to scrutiny. Since 1800, there have been massive and persistent imbalances, and a repeated tendency by dominant powers to abuse their position to impose terms of trade that favor them, at the expense of poorer countries.

What is new about the current crisis is that the United States has been losing its grip on global power and now finds itself in a situation of unprecedented financial fragility. That explains the aggressiveness of the Trump administration. However, giving in to demands, as the Europeans have just done on military budgets (which are largely transfers to the US defense industry) or on multinational taxation, is the worst possible strategy. It is time for Europe to shake off its complacency and join forces with democracies of the Global South to rebuild the commercial and financial system in support of a different model of development.

First, let us remember that trade flows have never been higher than they are today. Total exports (and imports) now amount to around 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP), with 7% for raw materials (agricultural, mining and fossil fuels), 16% for manufactured goods and 7% for services (tourism, transport, consulting, etc). By comparison, trade flows were about 7% of global GDP in 1800, 15% in 1914 and 12% in 1970 (of which 4% was for raw materials, 5% for manufactured goods and 3% for services). The increase observed since 1970 has been dizzying across all sectors – with a material footprint and environmental damage that we are only beginning to realize. It is often pointed out that world trade has stabilized as a percentage of global GDP since the 2008 crisis. This is true, provided one specifies that it is a stabilization at the highest level ever recorded in history.

Let us turn to the imbalances. The basic fact is well known: Between 1990 and 2025, the US ran an average annual trade deficit (goods and services combined) of about 3% to 4% of its GDP. The country’s surpluses in services have been much too small to offset enormous deficits in manufactured goods. This fact sometimes provokes disbelief: How can the dominant power permanently run a trade deficit? In reality, this is the historical norm. From 1800 to 1914, the European powers – led by the United Kingdom – ran permanent trade deficits. Surpluses in manufactured goods and shipping were far outweighed by the vast flows of raw materials from the rest of the world (cotton, wood, sugar, etc), even though these were poorly compensated. Between 1880 and 1914, the continent’s major powers (UK, France, Germany) posted average annual deficits of the same order of magnitude as those of the US between 1990 and 2025.

The difference is that European powers then held overseas possessions that generated huge annual revenues – equivalent to 10% of GDP for the UK and more than 5% for France. That allowed them to easily finance their trade deficits while continuing to accumulate debts around the world.

By contrast, the US’s overseas assets have never generated sufficient income to offset its deficits, leaving the country with an unprecedented level of external debt. The world’s dominant military power could soon find itself having to make substantial, long-term interest payments to the rest of the world, something never before seen in history. This is the source of Trumpist anxiety and his followers’ desperate attempts to extract wealth from the rest of the world, by force if necessary.

One argument used to justify such extortion is that the country provides a free global public good: a stable currency and a sound financial system. The rest of the world thus accumulates assets in dollars – public debt and equities – which drive up the value of the greenback and feeds the US trade deficit. In reality, the dollar has already brought the US much more than it should have. The argument is nonetheless worth considering, especially since it could lead to solutions very different from those advocated by Trumpists.

In practice, the massive surpluses of oil-producing countries in recent decades are primarily explained by their success in tripling prices in the 1970s while the rest of the world continued to consume fossil fuels regardless of future consequences. The industrial surpluses of China, Japan and Germany can be explained in part by excessively low wages and a choice to hoard wealth abroad, fueled by a sense of vulnerability to the international financial system and the absence of a global reserve asset.

In the face of global imbalances, the right response would be to establish a common currency indexed to the main currencies, allowing the world to break free from the dollar and improve terms of trade for poorer countries, all with the aim of funding a more balanced and sustainable development model. Let us hope that Trump’s brutality at least accelerates this realization.

By opposing the 2% minimum wealth tax on the 1,800 French people whose net worth exceeds €100 million, after the measure was adopted by France’s Assemblée nationale (lower house of Parliament), the upper house, the Sénat, has shown just how disconnected it is from the issues of our time. This is nothing new. Between 1896 and 1914, the Sénat blocked income tax measures, with arguments as fallacious as those used today. However, let’s reassure ourselves: The funding needs for social and climate challenges, as well as the public debt, are so significant that this opposition will not hold out long when faced with the current economic, political, and environmental realities, which will very soon require far more radical redistributive measures.

Let’s first look at the arguments put forward by the Sénat and President Emmanuel Macron’s supporters. Is this a confiscatory tax? That idea makes little sense. According to Challenges magazine, which is hardly a bastion of left-wing thought, France’s 500 highest fortunes rose from €200 billion to €1.2 trillion between 2010 and 2025 – a 500% increase. With a 2% annual wealth tax, it would take a century to make them go back to their 2010 level. That’s assuming they receive no income in the meantime, which would make little sense, given that these fortunes have grown by 7% to 8% per year over the past 15 years.

Would there be tax exiles? The bill adopted by the Assemblée Nationale already provides for an initial mechanism to address this: Billionaires would continue to be subject to the minimum wealth tax for five years after leaving the country, limiting the appeal of a tax exile. We must go further: If one builds a fortune while relying on the country’s infrastructure, education, and health systems, there is no reason that one should so readily escape the collective obligations that fund these systems. For example, we could decide to apply the tax on the basis of the number of years spent in France. A taxpayer who has lived in Switzerland for one year after spending 50 years in France would continue to pay 50/51sts of tax owed by a French citizen. Those who refuse to pay would be breaking the law, and would face the corresponding penalties (asset seizure, arrest at airports), just like anyone else.

What about the risk of seeing our flagship national companies bought out by foreigners? Once again, this argument does not hold water. France is brimming with savings. If some billionaires cannot pay the 2% tax in cash, they could absolutely pay it in shares, which the state could then sell as it sees fit – for example, to benefit interested employees. This would also be an opportunity to grant French employees the company board voting rights that have applied in Germany or Sweden since the postwar period (in which workers select between one-third and half of all seats on supervisory boards, regardless of capital ownership). These have delivered excellent results in both countries (the most productive ones in the world, per hour worked). Wealth is collective: It depends on the involvement of thousands of employees, not a handful of individual geniuses.

Would the minimum wealth tax be unconstitutional? This legal argument comes back around to contradict itself. In reality, it is the fact that the richest individuals escape the common legal taxes that undermines the constitutional principle of equality before taxes, and should have been refused long ago. Ultimately, like all major tax debates since 1789, this is, above all, a political and democratic debate. It must be approached with solid arguments, not by hiding behind pseudo-legal justifications designed to perpetuate blatant injustice.

What is striking is that opponents of the minimum wealth tax totally lack historical perspective. The funding needs linked to decarbonization are enormous, as are those for the health and education systems, all together with the public debt we all know about. It is unrealistic to imagine that the working class and the middle class will calmly accept additional taxes or cuts to public spending. So long as the wealthiest individuals pay taxes that are trivial relative to their net worth, no one will accept the slightest sacrifice. Just as in the decades that came before 1789, the headlong rush into public debt will continue as long as those in power refuse the necessary fiscal revolution.

History also teaches us that a debt of this magnitude cannot be escaped with ordinary measures. During the Revolution, the abolition of the nobility’s tax privileges (the equivalent to the 2% minimum wealth tax) was followed by an even more radical measure: the public appropriation and auctioning off of Church property, which was then about one year of national income, roughly equal to the amount of public debt at the time. The billionaires of 2025 are the equivalent of the Church’s assets in 1789: Their fortunes will have to be made to contribute, to redistribute the wealth to employees and reduce the debt. The €1 trillion increase that the 500 largest fortunes have benefited from since 2010 will eventually have to be taxed at 30%, 40%, 50% or more, just like ordinary taxpayers. Ultimately, multimillionaires, and not just centimillionaires, will have to contribute. This is what was done in postwar Germany with the Lastenausgleich (« burden sharing ») system, which generated the equivalent of 60% of Germany’s GDP in 1952. This is the only way to reduce a public debt of such magnitude, without inflation and without sacrificing future investments.

In 1914, the Sénat finally accepted the income tax, albeit reluctantly, with a marginal rate of only 2% for the highest income levels. Ironically, it was the Bloc National (1919-1924) – one of the most right-wing legislatures in the French Republic’s history – that would raise the tax rate to 60% in 1920, and then to 75% in 1923, under pressure from the left and the trade unions. If the senators opened up their history books a little more often, they might become a little wiser.

En s’opposant à l’impôt plancher de 2% sur le patrimoine des 1800 Français détenant plus de 100 millions d’euros adopté par l’Assemblée nationale, le Sénat vient de montrer à quel point il était déconnecté des enjeux de notre époque. Ce n’est pas nouveau: entre 1896 et 1914, le Sénat avait déjà bloqué l’impôt sur le revenu, avec des arguments aussi fallacieux qu’aujourd’hui. Mais rassurons-nous: les besoins de financement liés aux défis sociaux et climatiques et à la dette publique sont tellement considérables que ces blocages ne résisteront pas longtemps face aux réalités économiques, politiques et environnementales, qui imposeront très vite des mesures de redistribution autrement plus radicales.

Reprenons d’abord les arguments du Sénat et des macronistes. Un impôt confiscatoire? L’idée n’a pas beaucoup de sens. D’après le magazine Challenges, qui n’est pas un repère de gauchistes, les 500 plus grandes fortunes sont passées de 200 milliards à 1200 milliards entre 2010 et 2025, soit une progression de 500%. Avec une taxe de 2% par an, il faudrait un siècle pour les faire revenir à leur niveau de 2010, à supposer qu’ils ne gagnent aucun revenu dans l’intervalle. Ce qui n’a pas beaucoup de sens vu qu’ils se sont enrichis de 7-8% par an au cours des 15 dernières années.

L’exil fiscal? La loi adoptée par l’Assemblée prévoit un premier mécanisme pour y faire face: les milliardaires continuent d’être soumis à l’impôt plancher cinq ans après leur départ, ce qui limite l’intérêt de l’exil. Il faut aller plus loin: à partir du moment où l’on a bâti sa fortune en s’appuyant sur les infrastructures du pays, son système éducatif et sanitaire, il n’y a aucune raison que l’on échappe aussi vite aux charges communes permettant de financer le système en question. On pourrait décider par exemple d’appliquer l’impôt en fonction du nombre d’années passées en France. Un contribuable résidant depuis un an en Suisse après 50 années en France continuerait de payer 50/51^e de l’impôt dû par un résident français. Ceux qui refuseraient de payer se mettraient hors-la-loi et encourraient les sanctions correspondantes (saisie de biens, interpellation à l’aéroport), comme tout-un-chacun.

Le risque de voir nos champions nationaux rachetés par des étrangers? Là encore l’argument ne tient guère. La France regorge d’épargne. Si certains milliardaires ne peuvent payer cash l’impôt de 2%, alors ils peuvent parfaitement acquitter l’impôt en titres, que l’Etat revendra à sa guise, par exemple au bénéfice des salariés intéressés. Ce serait aussi l’occasion d’étendre aux salariés français les droits de vote appliqués en Allemagne ou en Suède depuis l’après-guerre (entre un tiers et la moitié des sièges aux conseils d’administration, indépendamment de toute participation au capital), ce qui a donné d’excellents résultats dans ces deux pays (les plus productifs du monde par heure travaillée). La richesse est collective: elle dépend de l’implication de milliers de salariés et non pas de quelques génies individuels.

L’impôt plancher serait inconstitutionnel ? Cet argument juridique se retourne sur lui-même. En réalité, c’est le fait que les plus riches échappent à l’impôt de droit commun qui mine le principe constitutionnel d’égalité face aux charges publiques et qui aurait dû être retoqué depuis longtemps. Pour finir, comme tous les grands débats fiscaux depuis 1789, il s’agit d’abord d’un débat politique et démocratique. Il faut l’aborder avec des arguments solides, et non pas en se dissimulant derrière de pseudos-arguments juridiques visant simplement à perpétuer une injustice criante.  

Ce qui frappe parmi les opposants à l’impôt plancher, c’est leur absence totale de perspective historique. Les besoins de financement liés à la décarbonation sont gigantesques, tout comme ceux du système de santé et de formation, le tout avec la dette publique que l’on connaît. Il est illusoire d’imaginer que les classes populaires et moyennes vont tranquillement accepter des impôts supplémentaires ou des coupes dans les dépenses publiques. Tant que les plus riches paieront des impôts dérisoires par rapport à leur richesse, personne n’acceptera le moindre sacrifice. De même que dans les décennies précédant 1789, la fuite en avant vers la dette publique continuera tant que les gouvernants refuseront la révolution fiscale qui s’impose.

L’histoire nous apprend aussi que l’on ne sort pas d’une dette de cette ampleur avec des mesures ordinaires. Sous la Révolution, l’abolition des privilèges fiscaux de la noblesse (l’équivalent de l’impôt plancher de 2%) fût suivie d’une mesure autrement plus radicale : l’appropriation publique et la mise aux enchères des biens de l’Eglise, dont la valeur avoisinait une année de revenu national, à peu près autant que la dette publique de l’époque. Les milliardaires de 2025 sont l’équivalent des biens ecclésiastiques de 1789: leur fortune devra être mise à contribution pour la redistribuer aux salariés et réduire la dette. L’enrichissement de 1000 milliards dont les 500 plus grandes fortunes ont bénéficié depuis 2010 devra être imposé à 30%, 40%, 50% ou davantage, comme les contribuables ordinaires. A terme, ce sont les multimillionnaires et non seulement les centimillionaires qui devront être sollicités. C’est ce qui a été fait dans l’Allemagne de l’après-guerre avec le système de « Lastenausgleich » (« partage du fardeau »), qui rapporta l’équivalent de 60% du PIB allemand de 1952. C’est la seule façon de réduire une dette publique de cette ampleur sans inflation et sans sacrifier les investissements d’avenir.   

En 1914, le Sénat finît par accepter l’impôt sur le revenu du bout des lèvres, avec un taux marginal de seulement 2% pour les plus hauts revenus. Ironie de l’histoire, c’est le Bloc National – l’une des Chambres les plus à droite de l’histoire de la République – qui va porter ce taux à 60% en 1920 puis 75% en 1923, sous la pression de la gauche et des syndicats. Si les sénateurs ouvraient un peu plus souvent les livres d’histoire, ils n’en seraient que plus sages.