Face à la déferlante trumpiste, il est urgent que l’Europe reprenne confiance en elle-même et propose à ses citoyens et au monde un autre modèle de développement. Pour y parvenir, il faut commencer par sortir de l’autodénigrement permanent qui tient trop souvent lieu de débat public sur notre continent. D’après la doxa en vigueur dans de nombreux cercles dirigeants, l’Europe vivrait au-dessus de ses moyens et devrait se serrer la ceinture. La dernière version de ce discours est qu’il faudrait couper dans les dépenses sociales afin de se concentrer sur la seule priorité qui vaille : la course-poursuite avec Trump et Poutine sur les dépenses militaires.

Le problème est que tout est faux dans ce diagnostic. Sur le plan économique, la réalité est que l’Europe a parfaitement les moyens – si cela s’avère utile – de poursuivre plusieurs objectifs en même temps.  En particulier, l’Europe dégage depuis des années de solides excédents de sa balance des paiements, alors que les États Unis ont un énorme déficit. Autrement dit, ce sont les Etats-Unis qui consomment et investissent sur leur territoire plus qu’ils ne produisent, alors que l’Europe fait exactement l’inverse et accumule son épargne dans le reste du monde (notamment aux Etats-Unis). Au cours des quinze dernières années, l’excédent annuel moyen atteint les 2% du PIB en Europe, ce qui ne s’est tout simplement jamais vu depuis plus d’un siècle. Il s’observe  en Europe du Sud aussi bien qu’en Allemagne et en Europe du Nord, avec des niveaux dépassant parfois les 5% du PIB. A l’inverse, les Etats-Unis ont accumulé depuis 2010 des déficits moyens de l’ordre de 4% du PIB. La France se situe à mi-chemin et affiche une balance des paiements en quasi-équilibre (avec un déficit inférieur à 1% du PIB et une population sensiblement plus jeune que ses voisins). La vérité est que l’Europe a des fondamentaux économiques et financiers plus sains que les Etats-Unis – tellement sains que le vrai risque est depuis longtemps de ne pas dépenser suffisamment. Plutôt que d’une cure d’austérité, l’Europe a surtout besoin d’une cure d’investissement si elle veut éviter une lente agonie, comme l’a bien diagnostiqué le rapport Dragui.

Mais elle doit le faire à sa façon, à l’européenne, en privilégiant le bien-être humain et le développement durable, et en se concentrant sur les infrastructures collectives (formation, santé, transports, énergie, climat). L’Europe a déjà dépassé les Etats-Unis sur le plan de la santé, avec un écart d’espérance de vie qui ne cesse de se creuser au bénéfice des Européens. Tout cela en dépensant à peine plus de 10% du PIB pour la santé du continent, alors que les Etats-Unis avoisinent les 18%, preuve s’il en est de l’inefficacité du secteur privé et des surcoûts qu’il génère, n’en déplaise à Musk et à ses brigades. L’Europe doit continuer de soutenir ses soignants pour qu’ils poursuivent sur cette lignée. Elle a aussi les moyens de dépasser définitivement les Etats-Unis sur le plan des transports, du climat, de la formation et de la productivité, pour peu qu’elle réalise les investissements publics nécessaires.

Si cela s’avère indispensable, l’Europe pourrait aussi augmenter ses dépenses militaires. Encore faut-il apporter la preuve de cette nécessité. Consacrer des milliards à l’armée est une façon facile de montrer que l’on fait quelque chose face à la menace russe, mais rien n’indique ce soit la plus efficace. Les budgets européens cumulés dépassent déjà largement les budgets russes. Le vrai enjeu est de dépenser ces sommes ensemble, et surtout de mettre en place des structures permettant de prendre des décisions collectives pour protéger efficacement le territoire ukrainien.

Pour financer la reconstruction du pays, il est également temps que l’Europe saisisse non seulement les actifs publics russes (300 milliards d’euros, dont 200 milliards en Europe) mais également les actifs privés, estimés à environ 1000 milliards, l’essentiel en Europe, et dont seules quelques miettes ont été saisies à ce jour. Cela exigera la mise en place d’un véritable cadastre financier européen permettant d’enregistrer enfin qui possède quoi sur notre continent, outil également indispensable pour lutter contre la grande délinquance et mener une politique de justice sociale et fiscale.  

Il reste la question essentielle. Pourquoi l’Europe, qui regorge d’épargne et constitue de facto la première puissance économique et financière de la planète, n’investit-elle pas davantage? Une explication classique est démographique : face au vieillissement, les pays européens préparent leurs vieux jours en accumulant des tonnes d’épargne dans le reste du monde. Il serait pourtant plus utile de dépenser ces sommes en Europe pour permettre aux jeunes générations de se projeter dans l’avenir. Une autre explication est le nationalisme : chaque pays européen suspecte son voisin de vouloir dilapider le produit de son travail et préfère le mettre sous clé. De fait, la mondialisation commerciale et financière a nourri une profonde inquiétude – en Suède après la crise bancaire de 1992 ou en Allemagne lors de la crise post-unification de 1998-1999 – et a engendré en Europe un repli vers l’épargne et le chacun-pour-soi, qui n’a fait que s’aggraver après la crise de 2008.

Mais le principal facteur est d’abord politique et institutionnel. Il n’existe aucun cadre démocratique où les citoyens européens pourraient décider collectivement de la meilleure façon d’utiliser les richesses qu’ils produisent. Actuellement, ces décisions sont de fait abandonnées à quelques grands groupes et à une mince couche sociale de dirigeants d’entreprises et d’actionnaires. La solution peut prendre plusieurs formes, comme celle d’une Union parlementaire européenne s’appuyant sur un noyau dur de pays. Ce qui est certain, c’est que la demande d’Europe n’a jamais été aussi forte, et que les dirigeants se doivent d’y répondre avec audace et imagination, au-delà des sentiers battus et des fausses certitudes.  

For anyone in doubt, Donald Trump has at least made things clear: the right exists and it speaks loudly. As has often been the case in the past, it takes the form of a mixture of violent nationalism, social conservatism and unbridled economic liberalism. We could call Trumpism national-liberalism, or more accurately, national-capitalism. Trump’s remarks on Greenland and Panama show his attachment to the most aggressive, authoritarian and extractivist form of capitalism, which is basically the real and concrete form that economic liberalism has often taken throughout history, as Arnaud Orain has just reminded us in « Le Monde confisqué. Essai sur le capitalisme de la finitude, XVIe-XXIe siècle » (Flammarion, 2025) (« The confiscated world. Essay on the capitalism of finitude, 16th-21th century »).

Let’s be clear: Trump’s national capitalism likes to flaunt its strength, but it is actually fragile and at bay. Europe has the means to confront it, provided it regains confidence in itself, forges new alliances and calmly analyzes the strengths and limitations of this ideological framework.

Europe is well placed to do so. It has long based its development on a similar military-extractivist pattern, for better or for worse. After forcibly seizing control of sea routes, raw materials and the global textile market, European powers imposed colonial tribute on all resistant nations throughout the 19th century, from Haiti to China and Morocco. By 1914, they were engaged in a fierce struggle for control of territories, resources and global capitalism. They even imposed increasingly exorbitant tributes on one another – Prussia demanded tribute from France in 1871, then France from Germany in 1919: 132 billion gold marks, more than three years of German GDP at the time. A ratio comparable to the tribute imposed on Haiti in 1825, except that this time Germany had the means to defend itself. Endless escalation led to the collapse of the system and of Europe’s hubris.

This is the first weakness of national capitalism: when powers reach a boiling point, they end up devouring each other. The second is that the dream of prosperity promised by national capitalism always ends up disappointing public expectations because it is, in reality, built on exacerbated social hierarchies and an ever-growing concentration of wealth. If the Republican Party has become so nationalistic and virulent toward the outside world, it is first and foremost due to the failure of Reagan-era policies, which were supposed to boost growth, but only slowed it and led to stagnating incomes for most. In the mid-20th century, American productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked, was double that of Europe, thanks to the country’s educational advantage. Since the 1990s, it has been at the same level as that of the most advanced European countries (Germany, France, Sweden or Denmark), with differences so small they are statistically indistinguishable.

Impressed by market capitalizations and billion-dollar figures, some observers are amazed by the US’s economic power. They forget that these valuations stem from the monopoly dominance of a few major groups, and, more broadly, that the astronomical dollar amounts reflect the very high prices imposed on American consumers. It’s akin to analyzing wage trends without taking inflation into account. When measured in terms of purchasing power parity, the reality is very different: the productivity gap with Europe disappears entirely.

Using this measurement, China’s GDP surpassed that of the US in 2016. It is currently more than 30% higher and will reach double the US GDP by 2035. This has very real consequences in terms of its capacity to influence and finance investment in the Global South, especially if the US locks itself into its arrogant, neo-colonial posture. The reality is that the US is on the verge of losing control of the world, and Trump’s rhetoric won’t change that.

Let’s summarize: the strength of national capitalism lies in glorifying power and national identity while denouncing the illusions of carefree rhetoric about universal harmony and class equality. Its weakness is that it clashes with power struggles and forgets that sustainable prosperity requires an educational, social and environmental investment that benefits all.

In the face of Trumpism, Europe must, first and foremost, remain true to itself. No one on the continent, not even the nationalist right, wants to return to the military postures of the past. Rather than devoting its resources to an endless arms race – Trump is now demanding military budgets of up to 5% of GDP – Europe must base its influence on law and justice. Targeted financial sanctions, effectively applied to a few thousand leaders, can make a stronger impact than stockpiling tanks. Above all, Europe must heed the calls from the Global South for economic, fiscal and climate justice. It must renew its commitment to social investment and definitively overtake the US in terms of training and productivity, just as it has already done in terms of health and life expectancy. After 1945, Europe rebuilt itself through the welfare state and the social-democratic revolution. This project remains unfinished: on the contrary, it must be seen as the beginning of a model of democratic and ecological socialism that must now be thought through on a global scale.

A la veille de l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump, d’Elon Musk et des patrons de la tech ralliés au trumpisme, Joe Biden a lancé, lors de son discours d’adieu, une vigoureuse mise en garde contre l’émergence d’une nouvelle « oligarchie techno-industrielle » menaçant l’idéal démocratique états-unien. Pour le président sortant, la concentration extrême des richesses et du pouvoir risque de remettre en cause « nos droits élémentaires, nos libertés, et la possibilité pour chacun d’avoir une chance équitable de s’en sortir ».

Biden n’a pas tort. Le problème est qu’il n’a pas fait grand-chose pour s’opposer à la dérive oligarchique en cours dans son pays et à l’échelle mondiale. Dans les années 1930, son prédécesseur Roosevelt, lui aussi très inquiet de telles dérives, ne s’était pas contenté de faire des discours. Sous son impulsion, les démocrates se lancèrent dans une vigoureuse politique de réduction des inégalités sociales (avec des taux d’imposition appliqués aux plus hauts revenus avoisinant les 70 %-80 % pendant un demi-siècle) et d’investissement dans les infrastructures publiques, la santé et l’éducation.

Dans les années 1980, le républicain Ronald Reagan, jouant habilement du nationalisme et du sentiment de rattrapage, entreprit de mettre un terme au New Deal rooseveltien. Le problème est que les démocrates, loin de défendre cet héritage, ont en réalité contribué à légitimer et à pérenniser le tournant reaganien, notamment sous les présidences Clinton (1993-2001) et Obama (2009-2017).

Biden a souvent été décrit comme plus interventionniste que ses prédécesseurs sur le plan économique. Ce n’est pas totalement faux, à deux bémols importants près. Biden fait partie de ces démocrates qui ont voté le Tax Reform Act de 1986, la loi fondatrice du reaganisme, celle qui a démoli la progressivité fiscale rooseveltienne en abaissant le taux supérieur d’imposition à 28 %. Chacun peut se tromper, mais le problème est qu’il n’a jamais jugé utile d’expliquer qu’il avait fait une erreur ou qu’il avait changé d’avis. Or, si l’on ne finance pas ses dépenses, on alimente forcément l’inflation, autre sujet majeur sur lequel la contrition de Biden se fait toujours attendre.

Par ailleurs, le fameux plan de relance de l’administration sortante, étrangement nommé « Inflation Reduction Act », a surtout consisté à distribuer des subventions publiques à l’accumulation de capital privé. Nul doute que l’administration Trump va pousser à son paroxysme cette alliance sans retenue entre Etat fédéral et intérêts privés.

Les démocrates peuvent-ils changer de ligne à l’avenir ? Le poids de l’argent privé dans la politique états-unienne, aussi envahissant chez les démocrates que chez les républicains (voire davantage, même s’il faut tenir compte du développement récent des petits dons), invite à la prudence. Les chances du parti de retrouver de bons rails sont cependant réelles, d’une part car le mélange de nationalisme et d’ultralibéralisme qui arrive au pouvoir à Washington ne résoudra aucun des défis sociaux et environnementaux de notre époque, et d’autre part car le refus de l’oligarchie continue d’être au fondement de l’identité du pays.

En 2020, le duo Bernie Sanders-Elizabeth Warren proposait de prolonger le New Deal rooseveltien, avec en prime un méga-impôt sur la fortune (avec un taux atteignant 8 % par an sur les milliardaires, un niveau jamais atteint en Europe), un plan massif d’investissement dans les universités et les infrastructures publiques, et l’invention d’une véritable démocratie économique à l’américaine (avec d’importants droits de vote pour les salariés dans les conseils d’administration des entreprises, comme cela se pratique en Allemagne ou en Suède depuis des décennies). Les deux candidats firent quasiment jeu égal avec Biden et l’emportèrent massivement chez les plus jeunes. Déçus par l’expérience Biden-Harris, ces derniers se sont très peu mobilisés en 2024, ce qui a coûté cher aux démocrates. Il n’est pas du tout impossible qu’une candidature de type Sanders-Warren l’emporte à l’avenir.

Et surtout, il faut compter sur le reste du monde, qui pourrait bien être à l’origine des changements politiques les plus progressistes au cours des décennies à venir. Il ne faut certes pas attendre grand-chose des oligarchies autoritaires que sont devenues aujourd’hui la Chine et la Russie. Mais il existe aussi, au sein des BRICS, des démocraties bien vivantes rassemblant plus d’électeurs que tous les pays occidentaux réunis, à commencer par l’Inde, le Brésil et l’Afrique du Sud. En 2024, c’est le Brésil qui a soutenu au G20 l’idée d’un impôt mondial sur les milliardaires.

L’initiative a malheureusement été repoussée par les Occidentaux, qui, la même année, ont également jugé habile de s’opposer au projet de convention fiscale onusienne, histoire de préserver leur petit monopole sur la coopération fiscale internationale au sein du club de pays riches qu’est l’OCDE, et surtout d’éviter toute redistribution significative des recettes à l’échelle mondiale. Si, dans quelques années, l’Inde bascule à gauche et renvoie les nationalistes-affairistes du BJP dans l’opposition, hypothèse de plus en plus plausible, alors la pression venue du Sud en faveur de la justice fiscale et climatique pourrait bien devenir irrésistible.

Dans ce combat mondial de la démocratie contre l’oligarchie, il reste à espérer que les Européens sortiront de leur léthargie et joueront tout leur rôle. L’Europe a inventé au XXe siècle l’Etat social et la révolution sociale-démocrate, et c’est elle qui a le plus à perdre de l’hypercapitalisme trumpiste. Là encore, il faut rester optimiste : depuis le Covid-19, l’opinion attend beaucoup de l’Union européenne et se montre moins frileuse que ses dirigeants. Souhaitons que ces derniers se montrent à la hauteur et parviennent en 2025 à s’extirper de la méfiance réciproque et de l’autoflagellation permanente qui les empêchent d’avancer.

A few days ahead of Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and tech executives aligned with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement coming to power, Joe Biden delivered a forceful warning about the emergence of a new « tech industrial complex » threatening the US’s democratic ideal. For the outgoing president, the extreme concentration of wealth and power risked undermining « our entire democracy, our basic rights and freedoms, and a fair shot for everyone to get ahead. »

Biden is not wrong. The issue is that he has done little to oppose the oligarchic drift taking place both in his country and globally. In the 1930s, his predecessor Roosevelt, also deeply concerned about such trends, did not stop at making speeches. Under his leadership, Democrats implemented a robust policy of reducing social inequalities (with tax rates on the highest incomes nearing 70%–80% for half a century) and investing in public infrastructure, health, and education.

In the 1980s, Republican Ronald Reagan, deftly playing on nationalism and a feeling of catching up, undertook to dismantle Roosevelt’s New Deal. The problem was that Democrats, far from defending this legacy, actually helped legitimize and solidify Reagan’s turn, notably under the Clinton (1993-2001) and Obama (2009-2017) administrations.

Biden has often been described as more of an interventionist than his predecessors in economic matters. This is not entirely false, minus two major drawbacks. Biden was among the Democrats who voted for the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the foundational law of Reaganism, which dismantled Roosevelt’s progressive tax system by lowering the top tax rate to 28%. Everyone can make mistakes, but Biden has never felt it necessary to explain that he had made a mistake or changed his mind. If spending isn’t funded, inflation inevitably rises, another major issue on which we are still awaiting Biden’s remorse.

Moreover, the outgoing administration’s so-called « Inflation Reduction Act » primarily facilitated the flow of public funds into private enterprises, effectively supporting the accumulation of private capital. There is no doubt that the Trump administration will push this unrestrained alliance between the federal government and private interests to its peak.

Could Democrats change course in the future? The overwhelming influence of private money in US politics, as pervasive among Democrats as it is among Republicans (if not more so, even with the recent growth of small donations), urges caution. However, the party’s chances of finding its footing remain real. First, the mix of nationalism and ultra-liberalism taking power in Washington will solve none of the social and environmental challenges of our time. Second, opposition to oligarchy continues to be a cornerstone of the nation’s identity.

In 2020, the Bernie Sanders–Elizabeth Warren duo had proposed extending Roosevelt’s New Deal, with the addition of a mega-wealth tax (with rates reaching 8% annually on billionaires, a level never seen in Europe), a massive investment plan for universities and public infrastructure, and the invention of a US-tailored economic democracy (with significant voting rights for employees in corporate boards, as practiced in Germany and Sweden for decades). The two candidates had nearly tied with Biden and won overwhelmingly among younger voters. Disillusioned by the Biden-Harris experience, Democrat voters were largely absent in 2024, a costly blow to the party. It is entirely possible that a Sanders-Warren-style candidacy could succeed in the future.

Above all, the rest of the world might well spearhead the most progressive political changes in the decades to come. Little is expected from the authoritarian oligarchies that China and Russia have become. But within the BRICS, there are vibrant democracies representing more voters than all Western countries combined, starting with India, Brazil and South Africa. In 2024, Brazil supported the idea of a global wealth tax on billionaires at the G20.

The initiative was unfortunately rejected by the West, who, in the same year, also found it strategic to oppose a proposed UN tax convention, in an effort to maintain their monopoly over international tax cooperation within the rich-country club of the OECD. This stance also sought to avoid any significant redistribution of revenue on a global scale. If, in the coming years, India shifted to the left and sent the nationalist, business-oriented BJP into opposition – an increasingly plausible scenario – the pressure from the Global South for fiscal and climate justice could become irresistible.

In the global battle between democracy and oligarchy, one can only hope that Europeans will emerge from their lethargy and play their full role. Europe invented the welfare state and the social-democratic revolution in the 20th century, and it stands to lose the most from Trumpist hypercapitalism. Here again, there is reason for optimism: since the Covid-19 pandemic, the public expects a lot from the European Union and is less hesitant than its leaders. One can only hope that these leaders will rise to the occasion and, by 2025, manage to overcome the mutual distrust and perpetual self-criticism that has held them back.

Let’s face it: France will not emerge from its current political crisis by inventing a new central coalition. The idea that the country should be governed by bringing together all the so-called « reasonable » parties, from the center-left to the center-right, from the Parti Socialiste (PS) to Les Républicains (LR), excluding the « extremes » – La France Insoumise (LFI) on the left and the Rassemblement National (RN) on the right – is a dangerous illusion, which will only lead to further disappointment and strengthen the extremes in question. Firstly, because this coalition of the reasonable looks very much like a coalition of the better-off. Excluding the working class from government is certainly not the way out of the democratic crisis. Secondly, electoral democracy needs clear and accepted alternations to function properly.

The virtue of the left-right bipolarization, provided that its content is sufficiently rapidly renewed in the face of global change, is that it makes such alternations possible. Two coalitions driven by antagonistic but coherent visions of the future and based on divergent socio-economic interests alternate in power, and this is how voters can form their opinions, adjust their votes and have confidence in the democratic system itself. It was this virtuous model that enabled the consolidation of democracy throughout the 20th century, and it is toward a new left-right bipolarization that we must move today if we wish to avoid democratic disintegration.

Once that’s acknowledged, how do we proceed? In countries with a first-past-the-post system, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, bipolarization is a matter of course. But you have to know what kind of bipolarization you want. Across the Channel, Labour has replaced the Conservatives, but with a program so timid that it is already generating mistrust, having won power with a low score and thanks to very strong divisions on the right. Across the Atlantic, bipolarization has turned in on itself. After abandoning any redistributive ambitions, the Democrats have become, over the last few decades, the party of the most highly educated, and of the highest income earners.

The Republicans retain a strong support base among the business world, but they have succeeded at little cost in attracting the popular vote by breaking with the Democrats’ dogma of free trade and liberal, urban and elitist globalization. Time will tell whether a new turnaround is possible. What is certain is that it will require a major change of course for the Democrats. In a democracy, it’s impossible to obtain your best scores among both the most privileged and the most disadvantaged. If the Democrats want to become the party of social justice once again, it must accept the loss of the vote of the privileged by proposing vigorous redistribution measures, which will have to respond not only to the aspirations of the urban working class but also to that of small towns and rural areas. For example, you can’t bet everything on canceling student debt: You also need to reach out to those who have taken on debt to buy a home or a small business.

In the French context, these kinds of questions are posed differently. The left is still very much alive, but here too it has lost the popular vote in the towns and villages hard hit by trade liberalization, deindustrialization and the absence of public services. In 1981, the left scored virtually the same among the working class, whatever the size of the town or city. Over the last few decades, a territorial divide on a scale unseen for a century has emerged between the urban working class (who continue to vote left) and the rural working class (who have switched to the RN). It is on this territorial divide that the political tripartition was built: A n objectively very privileged central bloc intends to govern the country based on the divisions between the urban and rural working classes between the left and right blocs (A History of Political Conflict, by Julia Cagé and Thomas Piketty, 2023).

The presidential election can play a useful role in breaking out of this tripartition: It encourages people to come together in the second round, and can speed up the advent of a new bipolarization. But that won’t be enough: What we need above all is in-depth work within the political parties and the citizens who support them. On the left, the parties must learn to deliberate and settle their differences democratically, first by MPs from the Nouveau Front Populaire left-wing coalition voting among themselves, then by directly involving left-wing voters. The priority must be to respond to the aspirations of the working classes in all territories, and to rally people far beyond each party’s electoral base. In particular, LFI will have to show humility and accept a simple fact: Its current electoral core is real, but it is a minority in the country, and can hardly envisage victory in the second round.

On the right, it’s time for LR and the more right-wing factions of the Macronist camp to accept the idea that they need to form a majority coalition with the RN. This is already what they did when they voted for the immigration law and many other texts (such as the anti-tenant law). It’s time to openly embrace the union of the right, otherwise it will sooner or later be imposed at the ballot box. This is also what will force the RN to move away from easy posturing and to shift its economic and budgetary discourse to the right, contributing to the emergence of a new bipolarization. What is certain is that it is not healthy to leave LFI and RN outside the system: They must both assume their place within their respective coalitions and face the difficult test of power. This is the price democracy will have to pay to emerge from its current crisis.

In the wake of Donald Trump’s victory, Europe can no longer content itself with declarations of intent. It urgently needs to pull itself together and regain a grip on world affairs, without any illusions about what will come from the United States. The crux of the matter is that it is impossible to face up to the socio-economic, climatic and geopolitical challenges that are shaking the planet as long as the European Union (EU) makes its decisions by the unanimous vote of all 27 member states. Unfortunately, this is currently the case for all major decisions, particularly those with budgetary or financial implications.

The only way out of the impasse is for a strong core of countries, led by France and Germany, to finally put concrete proposals on the table enabling progress to be made on both budgetary and institutional fronts, without waiting for unanimous agreement from the other countries. The concept of a strong core to overcome the obstacles of unanimous consensus has been raised many times in the past, most recently in the report by Mario Draghi proposing a massive investment plan for Europe.

The time has now come to give it substance and make real progress. For this to happen, three conditions have to be met: This core group must be given solid institutional and democratic foundations; it is essential that Germany, and not just France, Italy or Spain, should be able to play its part, particularly on the budgetary front; and within each country, and at the European level as a whole, several political visions, from both the right and left, must be able to express themselves and flourish.

Let’s start with the first point. To create a core group of countries capable of making important budgetary and financial decisions with all the necessary democratic legitimacy, it is important to base it on a solid institutional and political framework. The most logical starting point would be the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA), set up in 2019 as part of the renewal of the bilateral Franco-German treaty. A young and little-known institution, made up of 100 lawmakers from all the parliamentary groups in the Assemblée Nationale and Bundestag, the APFA has met between two and three times a year since its creation and has so far been confined to a mainly consultative role.

But there’s nothing to prevent the two countries from giving it an essential decision-making role, particularly on budgetary matters, and opening it up to all EU countries wishing to join this strong core, thus transforming it into a genuine European assembly, as in the draft « Manifesto for the Democratization of Europe » (tdem.eu). This strengthened parliamentary union, which could be called a « European parliamentary union » (EPU), would bring together within the EU those countries ready to unite further to influence world affairs and invest in the future, and in particular to borrow jointly to finance investments in energy, transport, research and new technologies.

Let’s turn to the second point. While some countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, can identify with such a vision, the central difficulty has always been to convince Germany, which is very reticent about the idea of joint borrowing, or even borrowing in general. This situation is now changing: A growing segment of the German public understands that the country urgently needs to invest in its infrastructure, in the disadvantaged regions of the East as well as throughout the country. This is now the majority opinion of German economists, recently joined by a large proportion of employers. In fact, the issue is in the process of shattering the coalition between the left and the liberals.

To overcome the last remaining reservations, however, it’s necessary to demonstrate that joint European borrowing is the right tool and guarantee that it will not lead to a « transfer union, » an absolute bogeyman on the other side of the Rhine. For example, it can be stipulated in advance that transfers will not exceed 0.1% of GDP (article 9 of the draft TDEM, see tdem.eu). This is unfortunate: If students from all over Europe are going to attend the same campuses to prepare for the future of the continent, then one day we’ll have to stop complex calculations and address all Europeans indiscriminately. But in the meantime, we need to find ways to move forward and build trust between countries and states with different histories. It’s worth the effort. The euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) now have such a global financial footprint that it’s in everyone’s interest to agree to borrow together, even without transfers.

Third and last point: For a project of such importance to see the light of day, it is essential that several political visions can be brought together. In the Draghi report, the approach is deliberately liberal and technophile. The former ECB president insists on public subsidies for private investment, for example in industry or artificial intelligence, and on clusters of excellence in major metropolises. Liberals and the right will also be in agreement and will no doubt emphasize the strengthening of military budgets and the promotion of a « fortress Europe. »

The left, on the other hand, will place the emphasis on social, educational and health investments, and infrastructure open to the greatest number of people, in poor suburbs as well as in outlying regions, as well as on tax justice objectives. It will be up to the European assembly and national parliaments to decide, on the basis of contradictory deliberations, under the watchful eye of Europe’s citizens. What does it matter if this reinforced union begins with just a few countries? The urgent need today is to react to the shock of Trumpism by asserting the strength of European values – those of parliamentary democracy, the social state and investment in the future.