Let’s face it: France will not emerge from its current political crisis by inventing a new central coalition. The idea that the country should be governed by bringing together all the so-called « reasonable » parties, from the center-left to the center-right, from the Parti Socialiste (PS) to Les Républicains (LR), excluding the « extremes » – La France Insoumise (LFI) on the left and the Rassemblement National (RN) on the right – is a dangerous illusion, which will only lead to further disappointment and strengthen the extremes in question. Firstly, because this coalition of the reasonable looks very much like a coalition of the better-off. Excluding the working class from government is certainly not the way out of the democratic crisis. Secondly, electoral democracy needs clear and accepted alternations to function properly.

The virtue of the left-right bipolarization, provided that its content is sufficiently rapidly renewed in the face of global change, is that it makes such alternations possible. Two coalitions driven by antagonistic but coherent visions of the future and based on divergent socio-economic interests alternate in power, and this is how voters can form their opinions, adjust their votes and have confidence in the democratic system itself. It was this virtuous model that enabled the consolidation of democracy throughout the 20th century, and it is toward a new left-right bipolarization that we must move today if we wish to avoid democratic disintegration.

Once that’s acknowledged, how do we proceed? In countries with a first-past-the-post system, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, bipolarization is a matter of course. But you have to know what kind of bipolarization you want. Across the Channel, Labour has replaced the Conservatives, but with a program so timid that it is already generating mistrust, having won power with a low score and thanks to very strong divisions on the right. Across the Atlantic, bipolarization has turned in on itself. After abandoning any redistributive ambitions, the Democrats have become, over the last few decades, the party of the most highly educated, and of the highest income earners.

The Republicans retain a strong support base among the business world, but they have succeeded at little cost in attracting the popular vote by breaking with the Democrats’ dogma of free trade and liberal, urban and elitist globalization. Time will tell whether a new turnaround is possible. What is certain is that it will require a major change of course for the Democrats. In a democracy, it’s impossible to obtain your best scores among both the most privileged and the most disadvantaged. If the Democrats want to become the party of social justice once again, it must accept the loss of the vote of the privileged by proposing vigorous redistribution measures, which will have to respond not only to the aspirations of the urban working class but also to that of small towns and rural areas. For example, you can’t bet everything on canceling student debt: You also need to reach out to those who have taken on debt to buy a home or a small business.

In the French context, these kinds of questions are posed differently. The left is still very much alive, but here too it has lost the popular vote in the towns and villages hard hit by trade liberalization, deindustrialization and the absence of public services. In 1981, the left scored virtually the same among the working class, whatever the size of the town or city. Over the last few decades, a territorial divide on a scale unseen for a century has emerged between the urban working class (who continue to vote left) and the rural working class (who have switched to the RN). It is on this territorial divide that the political tripartition was built: A n objectively very privileged central bloc intends to govern the country based on the divisions between the urban and rural working classes between the left and right blocs (A History of Political Conflict, by Julia Cagé and Thomas Piketty, 2023).

The presidential election can play a useful role in breaking out of this tripartition: It encourages people to come together in the second round, and can speed up the advent of a new bipolarization. But that won’t be enough: What we need above all is in-depth work within the political parties and the citizens who support them. On the left, the parties must learn to deliberate and settle their differences democratically, first by MPs from the Nouveau Front Populaire left-wing coalition voting among themselves, then by directly involving left-wing voters. The priority must be to respond to the aspirations of the working classes in all territories, and to rally people far beyond each party’s electoral base. In particular, LFI will have to show humility and accept a simple fact: Its current electoral core is real, but it is a minority in the country, and can hardly envisage victory in the second round.

On the right, it’s time for LR and the more right-wing factions of the Macronist camp to accept the idea that they need to form a majority coalition with the RN. This is already what they did when they voted for the immigration law and many other texts (such as the anti-tenant law). It’s time to openly embrace the union of the right, otherwise it will sooner or later be imposed at the ballot box. This is also what will force the RN to move away from easy posturing and to shift its economic and budgetary discourse to the right, contributing to the emergence of a new bipolarization. What is certain is that it is not healthy to leave LFI and RN outside the system: They must both assume their place within their respective coalitions and face the difficult test of power. This is the price democracy will have to pay to emerge from its current crisis.

In the wake of Donald Trump’s victory, Europe can no longer content itself with declarations of intent. It urgently needs to pull itself together and regain a grip on world affairs, without any illusions about what will come from the United States. The crux of the matter is that it is impossible to face up to the socio-economic, climatic and geopolitical challenges that are shaking the planet as long as the European Union (EU) makes its decisions by the unanimous vote of all 27 member states. Unfortunately, this is currently the case for all major decisions, particularly those with budgetary or financial implications.

The only way out of the impasse is for a strong core of countries, led by France and Germany, to finally put concrete proposals on the table enabling progress to be made on both budgetary and institutional fronts, without waiting for unanimous agreement from the other countries. The concept of a strong core to overcome the obstacles of unanimous consensus has been raised many times in the past, most recently in the report by Mario Draghi proposing a massive investment plan for Europe.

The time has now come to give it substance and make real progress. For this to happen, three conditions have to be met: This core group must be given solid institutional and democratic foundations; it is essential that Germany, and not just France, Italy or Spain, should be able to play its part, particularly on the budgetary front; and within each country, and at the European level as a whole, several political visions, from both the right and left, must be able to express themselves and flourish.

Let’s start with the first point. To create a core group of countries capable of making important budgetary and financial decisions with all the necessary democratic legitimacy, it is important to base it on a solid institutional and political framework. The most logical starting point would be the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly (FGPA), set up in 2019 as part of the renewal of the bilateral Franco-German treaty. A young and little-known institution, made up of 100 lawmakers from all the parliamentary groups in the Assemblée Nationale and Bundestag, the APFA has met between two and three times a year since its creation and has so far been confined to a mainly consultative role.

But there’s nothing to prevent the two countries from giving it an essential decision-making role, particularly on budgetary matters, and opening it up to all EU countries wishing to join this strong core, thus transforming it into a genuine European assembly, as in the draft « Manifesto for the Democratization of Europe » (tdem.eu). This strengthened parliamentary union, which could be called a « European parliamentary union » (EPU), would bring together within the EU those countries ready to unite further to influence world affairs and invest in the future, and in particular to borrow jointly to finance investments in energy, transport, research and new technologies.

Let’s turn to the second point. While some countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, can identify with such a vision, the central difficulty has always been to convince Germany, which is very reticent about the idea of joint borrowing, or even borrowing in general. This situation is now changing: A growing segment of the German public understands that the country urgently needs to invest in its infrastructure, in the disadvantaged regions of the East as well as throughout the country. This is now the majority opinion of German economists, recently joined by a large proportion of employers. In fact, the issue is in the process of shattering the coalition between the left and the liberals.

To overcome the last remaining reservations, however, it’s necessary to demonstrate that joint European borrowing is the right tool and guarantee that it will not lead to a « transfer union, » an absolute bogeyman on the other side of the Rhine. For example, it can be stipulated in advance that transfers will not exceed 0.1% of GDP (article 9 of the draft TDEM, see tdem.eu). This is unfortunate: If students from all over Europe are going to attend the same campuses to prepare for the future of the continent, then one day we’ll have to stop complex calculations and address all Europeans indiscriminately. But in the meantime, we need to find ways to move forward and build trust between countries and states with different histories. It’s worth the effort. The euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) now have such a global financial footprint that it’s in everyone’s interest to agree to borrow together, even without transfers.

Third and last point: For a project of such importance to see the light of day, it is essential that several political visions can be brought together. In the Draghi report, the approach is deliberately liberal and technophile. The former ECB president insists on public subsidies for private investment, for example in industry or artificial intelligence, and on clusters of excellence in major metropolises. Liberals and the right will also be in agreement and will no doubt emphasize the strengthening of military budgets and the promotion of a « fortress Europe. »

The left, on the other hand, will place the emphasis on social, educational and health investments, and infrastructure open to the greatest number of people, in poor suburbs as well as in outlying regions, as well as on tax justice objectives. It will be up to the European assembly and national parliaments to decide, on the basis of contradictory deliberations, under the watchful eye of Europe’s citizens. What does it matter if this reinforced union begins with just a few countries? The urgent need today is to react to the shock of Trumpism by asserting the strength of European values – those of parliamentary democracy, the social state and investment in the future.